



















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2119 
CATEGORY 4: LABOUR MARKETS 
OCTOBER 2007 
 
PRESENTED AT CESIFO AREA CONFERENCE ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL PROTECTION, MAY 2007 





An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









This paper studies a two-region model in which unemployment, education decisions and 
interregional migration are endogenous. The poorer region exhibits both lower wages and 
higher unemployment rates, and migrants to the richer region are disproportionally skilled. 
The brain drain from the poor to the rich region is accompanied by stronger incentives to 
acquire skills even for immobile workers. Regional shocks tend to affect both regions in a 
symmetric fashion, and skilled-biased technological change reduces wages of the unskilled. 
Both education and migration decisions are distorted by a uniform unemployment 
compensation, which justifies a corrective subsidization. 
JEL Code: H23, I20, J61, J64, R10. 






Department of Economics 
University of Paderborn 





Department of Economics 
University of Paderborn 






Ifo Institute for Economic Research 








September 28, 2007 1 Introduction
This paper studies the interaction of education, migration and unemploy-
ment in an interregional context. In particular, we are interested in the
consequences of having free migration between regions for educational deci-
sions, wage levels, and unemployment in both the sending and the receiving
region. We explore the mechanisms driving a brain drain out of the poor
sending region and identify channels how those left behind in the poor re-
gion may experience a counteracting brain gain via higher propensities to
acquire human capital. Moreover, we would like to know how regional and
national economic shocks a¤ect educational decisions and interregional mi-
gration. From a political perspective, the main objective is to rationalize
various sorts of active labor market policies that are pursued in lots of coun-
tries. Our discussion ofthe relevant externalities casts doubt onthe e¢ciency
of lots of these policies. We argue that some subsidies for both education
and migration can be justi…ed, while subsidies for education and training
programs at a rate of one hundred per cent seem doubtful.
It is frequently observed that substantial interregional wage di¤erentials
within a country exist, where the low-wage regions are also characterized
by comparatively high unemployment rates. For example, in Germany unit
labor costs in the East were at 65 per cent of the national average in 2004
while the unemployment rate in East Germany of around 20 per cent ex-
ceeded the national unemployment rate by more than 8 percentage points
(Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, 2006). Similar relations have been ob-
served for one decade, without any clear tendency of convergence. At the
same time, a higher formal quali…cation is always associated with a reduced
unemployment risk. Finally, the propensity to migrate is typically stronger
for high-skilled individuals than for the low-skilled.
Our model captures all these stylized facts. Unemployment arises ac-
cording to an e¢ciency wage argument of the shirking type. Migration and
educational decisions are endogenous, as there is a distribution of costs of
human capital acquisition and migration across individuals. Migration will
arise in only one direction, from the poor to therich region. It is a mechanism
that reduces the interregional wage and unemployment di¤erentials, albeit
not in a perfect fashion. There is a persistent technological gap between the
regions that is not explained.
From an allocative perspective, the presence of unemployment tends to
distort the decisions of individuals. Due to the unemployment rate di¤er-
1ential across skill groups within a region and across regions for a given skill
group, the incentives to acquire human capital and to migrate to the rich re-
gionboth tend to be too strong, as measuredby the productivity di¤erentials
of employed workers. This observation suggests to tax rather than to sub-
sidize education and migration. However, it turns out that the di¤erentials
in unemployment levels will also be taken into account in any second-best
allocation. Only changes of unemployment rates represent externalities of
education and migration decisions. By contrast, unemployment bene…ts will
reduce the incentive to become a skilled worker and lower interregional mo-
bility. Correcting for the latter distortions may require an education subsidy
and some mobility premium.
Our paper is related to di¤erent strands of the literature. Several rea-
sons have been given to explain the observation that individuals with a high
level of education face a relatively low unemployment risk. Skilled workers
have a wider range of employment opportunities (McKenna, 1996), and the
existence of sunk costs of investing in …rm-speci…c human capital makes it
less likely to lay o¤ skilled workers (Becker, 1993). Moreover, insiders may
be able to introduce barriers to entry for unemployed (Lindbeck and Snower,
1988; Zwick, 1998). However, the stable size of di¤erentials in skill-speci…c
unemployment rates may be altered at least in the short run by external
shocks, such as increasing average education drastically (Puhani, 2004) or by
immigration waves (Card, 1990).
Unemployment causes distortions of the individual decision to invest in
education. It may induce overinvestment in education, as unemployment dif-
ferentials lead individuals to quali…cation e¤orts although the productivity
gain lies below costs of education (Kodde, 1988). A similar outcome fol-
lows when education raises workers’ outside opportunities and gives them a
stronger position in the wage bargain (Charlot et al., 2005). Finally, in a
segmented labor market the relative increase in skilled labor may cause a
strong increase in unemployment among the remaining low-skilled (Albrecht
and Vroman, 2002). On the other hand, substantial forces toward underin-
vestment in education due tounemployment exist. The unemployment insur-
ance disproportionately bene…ts the low-skilled (Dellas, 1997), and workers
often cannot fully appropriate the productivity gains from their education
investments (Laing et al., 1995; Acemoglu, 1996). The additional investment
incentive created by the unemployment rate di¤erential may therefore in-
duce a welfare gain in the presence of such positive externalities (Cahuc and
Michel, 1996; Cubitt and Hargreaves Heap, 1999).
2Fewattempts have beenundertakento study theimpact of educationpol-
icy on unemployment theoretically. When skill-speci…c wages depend on the
respective unemployment rates, an increase in the relative supply of skilled
workers will not only increase total output, but also both skill-speci…c un-
employment rates. As the share of individuals with the lower unemploy-
ment rate increases, aggregate unemployment may move in either direction
(Saint-Paul, 1994, 1996). Hence, education policy has a negative general
equilibrium e¤ect that may more than o¤set the immediate gain in reducing
unemployment. However, capital in‡ows as a response to the increasing av-
erage education level can mitigate or even neutralize such negative general
equilibrium e¤ects (Bräuninger, 2000).
The empirical literature is mainly concerned with the direct employment
impacts of active labor market progams on the participants. As a general im-
pression, these direct e¤ects are typically negative before the program starts
due to reduced search e¤orts, insigni…cant in the …rst few months after com-
pletion (Heckman et al., 1999; Bergemann et al., 2004), but positive in the
medium and longer run (Lechner et al., 2005). The unusual large “knowl-
edge lift” education programme for low-skilled workers in Sweden 1997-2000
in which around 10% of the workforce participated led to positive impacts
on employment probabilities only for young men, and impacts on average
income of program participants were ambiguous (Albrecht et al., 2005).
Another strand of the literature is concerned with the interaction of ed-
ucation and migration. From an individual perspective, migration has to be
considered as an investment into human capital (Sjaastad, 1962). Returns
from migration are the higher, the younger and the more able or educated
a person is (Borjas, 2000). A quite di¤erent mechanism has been suggested
by Wildasin (2000) who argues that human capital investment increases spe-
cialization. Skilled workers could face problems …nding appropriate jobs,
unless they are interregionally mobile which increases their probability of a
successful match. Hence, the share of skilled workers among emigrants will
typically exceed the corresponding share of those left behind in the sending
region. If this happens, sending regions can be harmed by such a brain drain
as returns from public investment in education are lost. On the other hand,
it has often been argued that the option to migrate to a richer region or
country stimulates human capital investment also for those who ultimately
do not emigrate. In this way, the brain drain of the poor region is also asso-
ciated with a brain gain that may raise growth (Mountford, 1997; Stark et
al., 1997, 1998; Vidal, 1998; Beine et al., 2001). We identify a new channel
3for a brain gain that has been neglected in the literature up to now. In our
model, emigration pushes up both wages and the skill premium in the poor
region. Although the emigrants are disproportionally skilled, the share of
skilled workers among those staying in the poor region may increase, and
skill-speci…c unemployment rates will always fall. The old brain drain litera-
ture discusses some elements of this story in models with a traditional and a
modern sector (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; Mc Culloch and Yellen, 1975;
Rodriguez, 1975), but remains somewhat more pessimistic.
Finally, the interrelations between unemployment and migration have
been studied in several papers. Immigration typically has a short-run nega-
tive impact on the unemployment rate of directly competing natives, while
the e¤ects are often insigni…cant for the receiving region as a whole and
for longer time spans (Borjas, 1994). In a sending region, the possibility of
emigration will increase wage demands, which tends to perpetuate the in-
terregional unemployment di¤erential (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; Uhlig,
2006). Immigration may even bring natives’ unemployment down as …rms
will create more vacancies in view of more pro…table matches (Ortega, 2000).
The evidence on the impact of the incidence of unemployment on mi-
gration is mixed. In the US where interregional migration is substantial as
a mechanism of adjustment in the labor market, unemployed workers have
been found to be very mobile between regions (Pissarides and Wadsworth,
1989). By contrast, European regional labor markets show stronger changes
in participation rates (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Decressin and Fatás, 1995;
Obstfeld and Peri, 1998), and interregional migration sets in later (Möller,
2001). The skill level also a¤ects the reaction to unemployment: Skilled
workers tend to move to another region while the unskilled tend to drop out
of the labor force (Mauro and Spilimbergo, 1999).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After introducing
the model in Section 2, the following Section 3 characterizes equilibria and
investigates issues ofstabilityandtheinteractionofwages. Section 4analyzes
the impacts of the population and technical parameters on the wages in the
regions. Section 5 is concerned with a welfare analysis of the equilibria and
discusses policies to overcome the resulting ine¢ciencies. Finally, Section 6
concludes and indicates directions for future research.
42 The model
Weconsidertworegions. Without loss ofgenerality, Aisthe high-wageregion
and B the low-wage region. There are two skill groups, low-skilled (type L)
and high-skilled workers (type H). An individual of skill type k working
in region i in period t receives the wage wk
it. Individuals are characterized
by their place of birth, their idiosyncratic cost of acquiring human capital c





density function '(c;d) that describes the distribution of costs is the same
in both regions, and c and d are statistically independent. Thus, F(c) = Rc
0 f(x)dx is the conditional cumulative density function with respect to the





total initial number of individuals in each region is Ni.
We analyze a framework in which production starts after educational and
migration decisions have taken place. Individuals …rst decide on acquiring
skills in the home region, and afterwards on migration to the other region,
where they possess perfect foresight with respect to wages and unemploy-
ment rates in equilibrium. Jobs are randomly allocated among all workers
supplying labor of a speci…c type in a given region.
Let pk
i be the unemployment probability of an individual of skill type k
living in region i in this period. The unemployment rate of skilled workers,
µi := pH
i will always fall short of the unemployment rate of unskilled workers
in the same region Ãi := pL
i . Suppose that unemployed regardless of their
skill type receive a uniform unemployment bene…t w. The utility function u
satis…es the properties u(0) = 0; u0 > 0; and u00 · 0: The value of living in


















where e > 0 is e¤ort exerted at the workplace, being identical for all jobs. An
individual of type k will migrate from his birth region i to the other region
j if and only if V k
j ¡ V k
i > d.
Inthe…rst stage, theindividual beingborninregioni decides onacquiring















This de…nes a cuto¤ level of e c, which may depend on the migration cost d.















5the cuto¤ level e c decreases with a higher cost of migration d. This situation
may arise if the absolute wage interregional di¤erential of skilled workers
exceeds the correspondingwage di¤erential of unskilledworkers. Ifci denotes
the threshold education cost of those born in region i with the maximum
migration cost, all individuals with a higher cost of education c > ci who do
nevertheless acquire skills will migrate to the other region.
Let Ui and Si denote total employment of low-skilled and high-skilled la-
bor in regioni, respectively. The production function is given by Gi(Si;Ui) =
¯iG(Si;Ui) with ¯A > ¯B > 0, where G is a strictly concave function with
decreasing returns toscale. Without migration, wages in regionA will always
exceed the corresponding type-speci…c wages in region B.
We consider the standard shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
Employed workers choose whether or not to shirk. The probability that a
shirker is caught and …red immediately is given by q. Workers are in…nitely
lived, where r denotes the discount rate, b is the exogenous separation rate,
and a is the job acquisition rate. The asset equations of employed shirkers,
employed non-shirkers and unemployed are respectively given by



















: Rearranging terms and utilizing the ‡ow equilibrium con-
dition ap = b(1¡p); the no-shirking condition, describing the minimum wage
to induce e¤ort, can be derived from WN ¸ WS as







If (6) holds with equality, the inverse relationshipof wage and unemployment







It is obvious from (3) and (4) that employed workers earn the information
rent WE ¡ WU = e
q when the no-shirking condition holds with equality.
Noting (1) and (6), expected utility can be written as function of the wage,







dw = u0(w) ¡ p0(w)re
q > 0.
6Note that the same no-shirking curve holds for skilled andunskilled work-
ers. Workers arehired until their respective marginal productis equal to their









i = 0: (9)
As skilled workers have a higher marginal productivity than unskilled work-
ers at any given combination of employment of skilled and unskilled work-
ers (GS(S;U) > GU(S;U)), the unemployment rate of skilled workers always
falls short of the unemployment rate of unskilled workers. It may be useful to
distinguishsome cases. Whenskilledand unskilled workers areperfect substi-
tutes such that a low-skilledworker supplies one e¢ciency unit of labor while
a skilled worker supplies ¾ > 1 units, we always have GS(S;U) = ¾GU(S;U).
The two types of labor are substitutes if GSU < 0. They would be comple-
ments when GSU > 0.
Threshold costs Let Di; i 2 fA;Bg denote the di¤erential in expected
utility between high skilled and low skilled in region i, that is,
Di : = (1¡ µi)
£
u(wH













Similarly, let Dj; j 2 fH;Lg be the di¤erential inexpected utility for workers
of type j between countries A and B, that is,





































Given that there is only migration from region B to region A, the type-
speci…c thresholdmigrationcost that separates the migrants from the stayers
is given by DL ¡ dL = 0 and DH ¡ dH = 0: In region A, all individuals
7with human capital acquisition cost below cA will choose to become a skilled
worker, where cA satis…es DA ¡ cA = 0. Similarly, for individuals with a
migration cost above dH, those with a human capital acquisition cost below
cB obtain the quali…cation of a skilled worker, with DB ¡ cB = 0. Those
with a migration cost d < dH may nevertheless choose to become a skilled
worker when c < cm
B(d) with cm
B(d) = DB+DH¡d. However, it turns out to
be more attractive to migrate as a low-skilled worker if DL > DB + DH ¡ c.
As DB + DH = DA+ DL is valid by de…nition, the inequality is equivalent
to c > DA. Hence, those with cost of human capital acquisition c 2 [cB;DA]
and cost of migration d < e d(c) with e d(c) = dH+cB¡c will choose to become
educated only due to the perspective to migrate as a skilled worker later on.

























Figure 1. Migration and education thresholds
8Figure 1 depicts the structure of decisions in region B. Individuals with
low costs of migration and education will become skilled and migrate there-
after (…eld Hmig). Workers with characteristics associated with …eld Hnon
will acquire skills while staying in region B afterwards due to high costs of
migration. In …eld Lnon; both costs are high, such that it is optimal to re-
mainan unskilled worker inthe home regionB. Finally, those withhigh costs
of education and low costs of migration will migrate as low-skilled workers
to region A:
Choosing between staying as low-skilled worker in the poor region B
or becoming high-skilled worker in region A is governed by the sum of the
two costs c and d. For individuals with a higher sum of these costs and
a low cost of migration, migrating as a low-skilled worker is superior to
these two alternatives. This explains the diagonal in Figure 1 with a slope
of ¡1 between …elds Lnon and Lmig to the right, and Hmig to the left.
Furthermore, Lemma 1 shows that cA = cB + dH has to hold, such that the
diagonal in Figure 1 contains the points
¡
cB;dH¢
and (cA;0): Hence, it is
impossible to change one of these three threshold values independent of the
two other ones.
Lemma 1: The threshold values satisfy cA = cB + dH.
Proof. See Appendix A. ¤
Lemma 2 collects the results on the shares of skilled workers in the two
economies.
Lemma 2: (i) The share of individuals acquiring skills in region B is
smaller than in region A. (ii) Considering the individuals born in region B,
the share of skilled workers among the migrants to region A exceeds the share
of skilled workers remaining in region B. (iii) The share of skilled workers
among those staying in region B is smaller than the corresponding share
among the natives in region A. (iv) In a migration equilibrium, the share of
skilled workers in region A is higher than the corresponding share in region
B.
Proof. See Appendix B. ¤
The incentive to acquire skills is stronger inthe richregion due to ahigher
absolute expected wage premium. The larger weighted wage di¤erential is
also relevant for the migrants to the rich region and corresponds with a
stronger migration incentive for skilled workers. Therefore, a smaller share
9of individuals born in the poor region become skilled workers, and the share
of skilled workers among those left behind falls short of the share of skilled
workers among the migrants to the rich region. The migrants represent a
positive selection in terms of quali…cation from the original population of the
poor region. Takenthis selectione¤ect together withtheresultthat theshare
ofeducatedworkers among the natives of regionA exceeds the corresponding
share of those being born in region B; explains why this relation also holds
in any migation equilibrium.
While Lemma 1 depicts some clear-cut properties of any equilibrium, it
is not obvious whether the native population of region A is less or more
skill-intensive than the immigrants. On the one hand, the initial population
of region B is less skilled on average than the natives in region A. On the
other hand, the selectivity of migrants may o¤set this di¤erence in human
capital per worker. Hence, there is no immediate prediction on the “quality”
(Borjas, 1985) of immigrants compared to the natives in the receiving region.
At given education and migration thresholds it can be argued that the
poor regionsu¤ers from abrain drain, markedby the higher averageskill level
of the emigrants. Moreover, with a …xed education threshold cB, the share
of unskilled workers in the poor region is higher in the migration equilibrium
than in the absence of migration. However, migration from the poor to the
rich region makes labor scarcer in the poor region. Consequently, wages and
the expected absolute wage premium of skilled workers in the poor region
will be driven upwards. As this yields a higher education threshold, the
brain drain will be associated with a brain gain. This channel of a brain gain
has previously been neglected in the literature. The standard argument of a
brain gain states that the expected skill premium rises with the possibility
of emigration when people expect to migrate with some positive probability.
While this line of reasoning remains true, even those who know beforehand
that they will remain in the poor region tend to have a higher incentive to
become skilled due to general equilibrium e¤ects a¤ecting the structure of
wages. These e¤ects may even be more pronounced when skilled labor and
unskilled labor are complements, as the brain drain then also increases the
relative wage premium.
103 Equilibria, stability, and wage e¤ects
In the following we con…ne our attention to the structure in which the two
types of labor are perfect substitutes, that is, one unit of skilled labor is
equivalent to ¾ > 1 units of unskilled labor. Let Hi and Li denote total labor
supply of high-skilled and low-skilled workers in region i in a post-migration
situation. The no-shirking equations are identical for each type and region.
Thus, wi, the wage rate of low-skilled workers in region i, determines µi
and Ãi, the unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled workers in region i.
Consequently, the threshold values are functions of the respective wage rates.
Hence, we have µi(wi);Ãi(wi);cA(wA), cB(wB), dH(wA;wB) and dL(wA;wB):
It then turns out that the model boils down to a system of two equilibrium

























The dynamics of the system is described by
_ wA = h1[f1(wA;wB)] (15)
_ wB = h2[f2(wA;wB)] (16)
with h1(0) = h2(0) = 0; h0
1 > 0 and h0
2 > 0.
Thus, the wage rate in a regionmoves upward when the marginal product
of labor exceeds the wage rate, and vice versa. The equilibrium (wA; wB)
of the system of equations (15)-(16) is locally asymptotically stable only if
@ _ wA
@wA
· 0; @ _ wB
@wB








¸ 0 hold at the equilibrium
point.
These conditions are equivalent to @G0
A
@wA
¡ 1 · 0, @G0
B
@wB































































































> 0 are valid (see Figure
1). Furthermore, we have @HB
@dH < 0; @LB
@dH < 0, @HA




@dH > 0: Finally, @LB
@dL < 0; @HA
@dL = 0 and @LA
@dL > 0 hold. It is obvious that
the migration thresholds decrease with a smaller wage di¤erential. Thus,
@dk
@wA
> 0 and @dk
@wB
< 0 for k 2 fH;Lg. Further, Lemma 1 implies that
the impact of wi on ci at …xed wj, j 6= i must be positive. When cB(wB) +
dH(wA;wB) = cA(wA) always holds, the properties @dH
@wA




A > 0 and c0
B > 0.
The impact of a higher wage in the rich region A on the wage in the poor
region B is unambiguously positive. The rising interregional wage di¤eren-
tials increase the migration incentives for both high-skilled and low-skilled
workers. In addition, some individuals will choose to become educated and
to migrate as high-skilled worker rather than staying as low-skilled worker
in the poor region. This reduces the supply of both types of workers in the
poor region.
The impacts of a higher wage inthe poor regionB on the wage inthe rich
region A are a bit more complex. In Figure 1, the education threshold cost
cB increases, and the migration threshold costs dL and dH decrease, where
the intersection (cB,dH) moves down the diagonal towards (cA;0): In sum,
the supply of bothlow-skilled and high-skilled migrants falls, which increases
the marginal producticvity of labor in region A. The number of high-skilled
12migrants falls because the stronger propensity to become skilled in the poor
region does not compensate for the reduced migration incentive.
4 Comparative statics
Proposition 1 deals with the impacts of a population increase in one region,
which may best be interpreted as migration from abroad that is regionally
concentrated. Such a concentration can occur due to the possible existence
of networks for migrants in only one region.
Proposition 1: A higher initial population in the rich or the poor region,
NA or NB, will induce (i) lower wages, (ii) higher skill-speci…c unemployment
rates, and (iii) smaller education cost thresholds in both regions.
Proof. See Appendix C. ¤
At given education and migration thresholds and …xed unemployment
rates, an increasing population in the rich region A raises employment of
workers of both types in this region, reducing the wage rate wA: The falling
wage reduces the migration thresholds and the threshold education cost in
region B. While the former e¤ect contributes to a rising labor supply in
region B, the latter impact works in the opposite direction. It turns out that
the wage in the poor region falls because the reduction of migration is the
decisive factor. Since the no-shirking condition dictates that wage cuts are
always associated with more unemployment, all skill-speci…c unemployment
rates rise.
A rising population in the poor region B at given migration thresholds
directly increases employment ofbothtypes oflabor inbothregions, implying
a falling wage in both regions. The cross e¤ects of wages on each other are
always positive, reinforcing the downward pressure. This in turn increases
the skill-speci…c unemployment rates and reduces the education thresholds.
The next proposition summarizes the impacts of technological shocks.
These may be speci…c to a region by a¤ecting the technological factor ¯i.
Another possibility is an increase in the productivity factor ¾ of high-skilled
workers, which can be interpreted as skill-biased technological change.
Proposition 2: A rising productivityfactor in the rich or the poorregion,
¯A or ¯B, yields an increase of the wage rate and smaller group unemploy-
ment rate in both regions. A rising productivity factor of skilled workers ¾
13will decrease the wage of low-skilled workers in the both regions and increase
their regional unemployment rates.
Proof. See Appendix D. ¤
A higher productivity of workers in the rich region directly increases the
wage there. This wage increase yields stronger migration incentives in the
poor region, leading toan out‡owof workers of both types. Due to thereduc-
tion in labor supply, the wage rate in the poor region will also go up. Hence,
workers in the poor region will be a¤ected by a technological shock occuring
in the high-wage region in the same direction. If the productivity of labor in
the poor region increases, for example due to a successful imitation, there is
a direct positive e¤ect on the wage in the poor region. This wage increase
reduces the migration incentive to the high-wage region, which contributes
to rising wages across the board.
If the productivity of high-skilled workers increases, this yields more em-
ployment in both regions at given decision thresholds, leading to a lower
wage for the low-skilled. The increasing wage di¤erential between workers
of di¤erent skill types implies rising propensities to acquire skills in both re-
gions. Again, this tends to increase employment of labor in e¢ciency units
and to decrease wages. All these e¤ects are reinforced by the positive in-
terdependence of wages across regions. The regional unemployment rates
of the low-skilled rise because the motive to replace low-skilled workers by
high-skilled workers to avoid shirking is strengthened.
5 Welfare analysis
Taking as given that the ‡at unemployment bene…t w exists, it may be
asked whether the individuals’ economic decisions in combination yield an
e¢cient allocation. In the following, the marginal utility of consumption is
set constant to keep the analysis as simple as possible. The unemployment
rates that occur due to avoid shirking do not re‡ect a market failure. The
social planner maximizes total output,
¯AG((1¡ µA)¾HA+(1¡ ÃA)LA)+¯BG((1 ¡ µB)¾HB+(1¡ ÃB)LB); (20)
net of costs of e¤ort, education and migration, subject to the no-shirking
constraints.The latter can be expressed by explaining the group unemploy-
ment rates as increasing functions of labor supply in that region, that is
14pk








> 0. From a social point of view, ed-
ucation should be purchased if the cost of acquiring human capital is justi…ed
by the weighted gain in utility, correctedfor general equilibrium externalities.
An analogous consideration holds for migration decisions. The general equi-
librium externalities are derived from impacts of changes in unemployment
rates caused by changes in regional aggregate labor supply. By contrast, the
changing wages in itself turn out to be irrelevant. Considering education in





















When a worker acquires skills, aggregate labor supply in e¢ciency units in
the region increases. At given group unemployment rates, total employment
increases, depressing the marginal product of labor. Due to the no-shirking
conditions the resulting falling wages will be accompanied by higher group
unemployment rates.
Migrationof a worker of type X ²fL;Hg from regionB to regionA yields















The sign of ¡X is uncertain. While the reaction of the unemployment rate
to an increase in labor supply tends to be larger in the poorer region, the
expected loss in utility from an additional unemployed is higher in the rich
region. Migration reduces skill-speci…c unemployment rates in the sending
region and increases these group unemployment rates in the receiving region.





















¡ d + ¡
k > 0: (23)
15Similarly, the social planner will choose to qualify those workers being











¡ c +¡A > 0 (24)































holds. Comparing these conditions to the individuals’ criteria reveals that
the unemployment bene…t is a source of distortion. As the probability of
receiving this bene…t is higher for low-skilled workers, the number of workers
who acquire skills is too small. As with given skills the share of unemployed
is higher in the poor region, the number of migrants is also too small from
a social point of view. This consideration is slightly modi…ed by the general
equilibrium externalities.
Proposition 3 characterizes the optimal subsidies.
Proposition 3: A corrective region-speci…c education subsidy ¾j that





¡j, while the optimum type-speci…c migration subsidy ½i can be written as
½i = (pi
B ¡ pi
A)u(w) + ¡i: The level of the respective subsidy always falls
short of the full education or migration cost of the marginal individual.
Proof. See Appendix E. ¤
Neglecting the presumably small general equilibrium externalities, Propo-
sition 3 can be interpreted as follows. The higher the unemployment di¤er-
ential across skill groups or regions is, the higher the optimal subsidy will
be. As a reduction in the overall unemployment rate will typically decrease
these di¤erentials, we may also expect that such subsidies tend to be higher
in countries with a higher national unemployment rate.
The second part of Proposition 3 shows that the marginal individual will
always have tobear partof the investment or migration cost. This is ofcourse
a natural consequence of the fact that each type of human capital investment
decision is always associated with a gain in expected wage income. However,
it also indicates that it generally does not make sense to subsidize education
16and migration at a rate of 100% for the individuals with the highest cost
level. Otherwise, we would end up with only skilled workers, who all choose
to live in the rich region A:
This observation casts some doubts on active labor market policies pur-
sued in several countries. It is not unusual that education and training pro-
grams for the unemployed are sponsored by the national employment agency
at a rate of 100%. When reinterpreting our distribution of education costs as
distribution of success probabilities, we should expect that too many people
participate in highly subsidized education and training programs. Thus, it
is not astonishing that evaluation studies often …nd zero or small impacts of
such programs on subsequent employment probabilities and earnings of the
participants.
Under a perfect information scenario, it is always possible to achieve a
Pareto improvement on the resulting allocation without subsidies. This is
obviously true because total output net of all costs increases. The Pareto
improvement would be implemented by taxing residual income and distrib-
uting the proceeds as type-speci…c transfers to workers, where changes in
unemployment contributions are to be taken into account. Neglecting the
changes in residual income and unemployment contributions, all workers in
therichregion lose by moving toanallocationwithe¢cient investment levels.
The necessary transfers to ensure the status quo level of expected utility will
be highest for the marginal types who still invest in education or migration.
It cannot be excluded that negative minimum transfers arise for individuals
in the poor region who do not change their education decision.
By contrast, if the government cannot observe the type of the individual,
it will generally no longer be possible to implement a self-…nancing mech-
anism that induces all individuals to take the e¢cient investment decisions
and makes everybody better o¤ (see Kolmar and Meier, 2005, for amore gen-
eral discussion). In this situation, transfers for revealing the type or inducing
particular decisions have to be high enough to ensure a gain in expected util-
ity for the most unfortunate type. Unlike the perfect information scenario,
low-cost types cannot be deterred from taking up these high transfers. In
other words, education and migration subsidies cannot be restricted to indi-
viduals close to the threshold levels. Thus, due to the windfall pro…ts arising
for individuals with a low cost of education or a low cost of migration, it
is generally impossible to design a tax-transfer system that induces e¢cient
decisions and is preferred by everyone to the status quo.
176 Conclusions
We have developed a framework that mirrors the stylized facts of regional
wage and employment patterns, where the low-wage regions display dispro-
portionally high unemployment rates. Thepossibility of migration to aricher
region encourages human capital acquisition. As the absolute skill premium
adjusted by the incidence of unemployment and unemployment bene…ts is
higher in richer regions, the interregional adjusted wage di¤erentials will be
higher for skilled individuals. This yields some brain drain out of poor re-
gions. The out‡ow of labor then drives the skill premium in poor regions
up and increases incentives for human capital acquisition also for those who
choose not to migrate.
Regional shocks tend to be distributed symmetrically across all regions.
Additional international migration to rich regions will o¤set interregional mi-
gration. Hence, labor supply, wages and unemployment rates tend to display
similar reactions in all regions. Skill-biased technological change tends to
yield stronger incentives for human capital accumulation and interregional
migration and will bring down wages of the unskilled.
In a political perspective, apart from presumably small general equilib-
rium e¤ects, unemployment yields two distortions on human capital acqui-
sition and migration that work in opposite directions. The skill-speci…c and
interregional unemployment di¤erentials cause too strong incentives, com-
pared to a full employment situation. These are not relevant for politics
when unemployment is not associated with externalities. In contrast, unem-
ployment bene…ts can be received with a higher probability when being un-
skilled or located in poorer regions. As savings on aggregate unemployment
bene…ts are not taken into account by individuals, education and migration
incentives are associated with positive …scal externalities. The existence of
such externalities call for some subsidization of education and migration. At
the same time, the extremely high subsidies in some education and training
programs of active labor market policies seem to be exaggerated.
An obvious alternative to the current setup would be a framework with
a stochastic success of education. People would then be di¤erentiated ac-
cording to their success probability instead of their cost of education. Such a
change is not expectedto bring about qualitatively di¤erent results, however.
A more serious shortcoming may be seen in the absence of savings decisions
and changes of technology. Imitation and investment in physical capital may
reduce interregional di¤erences in the productivity of labor, which would
18bring down both unemployment rates and interrregional migration. On the
other hand, technological progress will primarily be achieved in rich regions
due to the concentration of skilled labor, which in turn also attracts invest-
ment ofphysical capital. Hence, while integrating suchdynamic factors tends
to bring aggregate unemployment down, it is unclear in advance how they
a¤ect the size of interregional di¤erences.
Appendix
A: Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that cA > dH + cB. Consider a cost combination (c;d) with cB <
c+d < cA and d > dH. As c > cB and d > dH; we would have a situation in
which remaining a low-skilled worker in region B is superior to becoming a
high-skilledworkerinregionB andthe latter option is preferable tobecoming
a high-skilled worker and migrating to the rich region: These two claims
contradict the implication of c+d < cA, that becoming a high-skilled worker
and migrating to region A is preferable to staying as a low-skilled worker in
region B:
Suppose that cA < dH + cB. Consider a cost combination (c;d) with
c + d > cA, d < dH and c < cB: As c < cB and d < dH; remaining a low-
skilled worker in region B is inferior to becoming a high-skilled worker in
region B; and the latter option is inferior to becoming a high-skilled worker
and migrating to the rich region: These two claims contradict the implication
of c + d > cA, that becoming a high-skilled worker and migrating to region
A is inferior to staying as a low-skilled worker in region B:
B: Proof of Lemma 2
Claim (i) is a consequence of e cB(d) = cA for d = 0, while e cB(d) < cA for any
d > 0: Claim (ii) is immediate from e cB(d) = cB for d ¸ dH, while e cB(d) > cB
for any d < dH: Taking into account the independence of the variables c and
d; the share of skilled workers among the stayers is bounded from above by
F(cB) =
RcB
0 f(c)dc. The share of skilled workers among thenatives inregion
A is F(cA). Recalling that cA > cB and f(c) > 0 for c 2 [cB;cA] then proves
claim (iii). Finally, claim (iv) is true because the properties (ii) and (iii) are
valid.
19C: Proof of Proposition 1





¢Njwi is the determinant of the Jacobian of the system (13)-(14), where the
column vector of derivatives with respect to wi has been replaced by the


































for derivatives with respect to NA and NB; respectively. As @G0
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and ¢ > 0 are required by the stability conditions where the boundary cases
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= ¡sgn¢NBwB < 0:
Unemployment rates change inversely to the wage rates according to (7).
Further, Lemma 1 implies that ci decreases with a falling wage wi.
20D: Proof of Proposition 2
The column vectors of derivatives of the system of equations (13)-(14) with
respect to ¯A, ¯B, and ¾ are
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Unemployment rates change inversely to the wage rates according to (7).
21E: Proof of Proposition 3
Comparing the individuals’ choice criteria to the conditions describing the
socially optimal investment in education and migration immediately shows
that ¾j and ½i exactly o¤set the distortions. The thresholdcosts in the social
optimum are de…ned by
c¤









































j , and wi
A > wi
B, it follows
that 0 < ¾j < c¤
j and 0 < ½i < di¤.
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